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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
I LORENCE E. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs. -
LEOHGE M. PAULSON, JR., 
Administrator of the Estate of 
SHARON MITCHELL, Deceased, 
l 1NITED PACIFIC INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation; FACTORY 
~!UTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA, a corporation, 
and AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
A\1ERICA, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 10385 
As in the brief of defendants and appellants, the same 
de~ignations of the parties will be used for convenience 
in this brief of plaintiff and respondent. Defendants and 
•ppellants, Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company 
ut America and Automobile Mutual Insurance Company 
Df America, will be considered one insurance company 
;1iJ will be referred to either as "Factory Mutual" or as 
1 
"the plaintiff's insurance company." The other 1·ns llrar 
company involved and named as a defendant iI1 tli . e CUI' 
below, namely, United Pacific Insurance Companv, will i 
referred to as "'United Pacific" or as "the driver's ·1·0, . • 0111a1, 
company." ·· 
The applicable insurance provisions involved are . 
forth below for convenience, side by side: 
FACTORY MUTUAL 
(Plaintiff's Policy) 
PART IV - " " " 
Uninsured Motorists 
(Damages for Bodily Injury) 
To pay all sums which the 
insured or his legal repre-
sentative shall be legally 
entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or op-
erator of an uninsured auto-
mobile because of bodily 
injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting 
therefrom, hereinafter 
called "bodily injury," sus-
tained bv the insured, 
caused by the accident and 
arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of 
such uninsured automobile; 
. . . (R. 9). 
Definitions - Insured. 
The definitions under Part 
I, except the definition of 
"insured," apply to Part IV, 
and under Part IV: 
"insured,, means: 
2 
UNITED PACIFIC 
(Driver's Policy) 
Damages for Bodily lnjun 
Caused by 
Uninsured Aut~mobilw 
To pay all sums whiclnli' 
insured or his legal reprt 
sentatives shall be legalh 
entitled to recover as dam 
ages from the owner or or 
erator of an uninsured aut~ 
mobile because of bodih 
injury, sickness or disea•1 
including death resultin'. 
therefrom, hereinaltf 
called "bodily injury," .111· 
tained by the insure,' 
caused bv accident and an 
ing out 'of the om1erslui 
maintenance or use ol 011' 
uninsured automobile: . 
( R. 32 ) . 
Definitions - Insured. 
The unqualified word i: 
sured" means 
( 1) the named msnr1'' 
as stated in the policy :lf". 
any person designaten 
· · · the named insured 
\ d J 
~ 111 d .un relative; 
' b ) any o the r person 
I , 
,1hilf occupying an insured 
.,1t1in1obile; and 
i c i any person, with re-
)pcct to damages he is en-
iitlcd to recover for care or 
lo\s of services because of 
i1uJih injury to which this 
cn1erage applies. 
This insurance afforded 
1rnder Part IV applies sep-
,1rately to each insured, but 
the inclusion herein of more 
tha11 one insured shall not 
operate to increase the lim-
it> of the company's liabil-
Il). (Emphasis added. ) 
IR. 9). 
3 
named insured in the sched-
ule and, while residents of 
the same household, the 
spouse of any such named 
insured and relatives of 
either; provided, if the 
named insured as stated in 
the policy is other than an 
individual or husband and 
wife who are residents of 
the same household, the 
named insured for the pur-
poses of thi~; endorsement 
shall be only a person so 
designated in the schedule; 
(2) any other person 
while occupying an insured 
automobile; and 
( 3) any person, with re-
spect to damages he is en-
titled to recover for care or 
loss of services because of 
bodily injury to which this 
endorsement applies. 
The insurance applies 
separately with respect to 
each named insured under 
this endorsement and resi-
dents of the same house-
hold, but neither this pro-
vision nor application of the 
insurance to more than one 
insured shall operate to in-
crease the limits of the com-
pany's liability. 
(R. 32). 
Other Insurance. 
With respect to bodily 
injury to an insured while 
occupying or through being 
struck by an uninsured au-
tomobile, if such insured is 
a named insured under oth-
er similar insurance avail-
able to him, then the dam-
ages shall be deemed not to 
exceed the higher of the 
applicable limits of liability 
of this insurance and such 
other insurance, and the 
company shall not be liable 
under this Part for a greater 
proportion of the applicable 
limit of liability of this Part 
than such limit bears to the 
sum of the applicable limits 
of liability of this insurance 
and such other insurance. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
(R. 10). 
Other lnsmancc. 
With respect to bodih 
IL 
jury to an insured 1\HJ 
occupying or thro11gh hfi~: 
struck by an uninstll'ed au. 
tomobile, if such insured, 
a named insured under otl. 
er similar insurance avmi 
able to him, then the dam 
ages shall be deemed not: 
exceed the higher of the ar 
plicable limits of liabilltr ,. 
this insurance and such ott 
er insurance, and the com-
pany shall not be habit 
under this endorsement for 
a greater proportion of tl1' 
applicable limit of liabiLr 
of this endorsement thar1 
such limit bears to the sur 
of the applicable limit1 ni 
liability of this insuranl'f 
and such other insuran~· 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. 33). 
No insurance is involved in this litigation other tni: 
the above uninsured motorist coverages (UMC). Bo\· 
policies have reference to occupants of the same vehid· 
Plaintiff was a passenger in the car insured by Unite· 
Pacific. Said car was driven by the wife of the insure'. 
of United Pacific. Sharon Mitchell, the driver of the otk 
vehicle was killed in the collision. It is agreed that Shari" 
Mitchell was an uninsured motorist at the time. (R E 
The reference by appellants to Utah's financial reip:·, 
sibility laws is immaterial because the limits of lrnhw 
4 
(ll bnth Factory Mutual and United Pacific were established 
hi contract ( R 7 and R. 32), and not by Section 41-12-1 ( k), 
l CA 195:3. However, although immaterial, it is interesting 
1,, remember that when the collision herein involved oc-
,11rrcd 011 April 4, 1961, the 1961 regular session of the 
Lc~islature had already approved an amendment to in-
cr~a1r the statutory limits of financial responsibility from 
SiilOO 00 to $10,000.00 for "bodily injury or death of one 
pmu11. in any one accident." (See 1965 pocket Supp., 
Section 41-12-1, UCA 19.53). 
\\'ith reference to appellants' comment, (page 5, Ap-
pellants' Brief), that no findings of fact were made by the 
trial court none are necessary when a motion for summary 
1
udgmcnt is granted under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The definitions of the Factory Mutual policy under 
Part IV ( UMC) incorporate by reference the definitions 
under Part I, except the definition of "insured" ( R. 9). 
Tlie Part I definition reads, in part, as follows: 
Ddinitions 
Under Part I: 
"named insured" means the individual named in 
Item 1 of the declarations and also includes his 
spouse, if a resident of the same household . . ." 
(R. 8). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE "OTHER INSURANCE PROVISIONS IN 
THE TWO POLICIES ARE CONFLICTING 
''EXCESS" CLAUSES. FACTORY MUTUAL 
5 
CAN APPARENTLY AVOID LIABILITY BE. 
CAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE 
SHE OCCUPIED A CAR NOT OWNED BY 
A "NAMED INSURED," AND Ul\'iTED PACI-
FIC COULD DISCLAIM LIABILITY BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF '"AS A "NAMED INSURED" UN. 
DER THE FACTORY i\1UTUAL POLICY. 
THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO FIND 
UNITED PACIFIC HAS "PRIMARY' LIABIL-
ITY. 
The rule that a policy or contract of insuranct i, 
to be construed liberally in favor of the insured ani 
strictly against the insurer is based upon variom 
reasons. The one most frequently advanced is tli~i 
an insurance contract, like any written agreement 
should, in case of doubt as to the meaning thereof. 
be interpreted against the party who has drawn 11 
and is responsible for the language employed thm 
in. Other reasons mentioned are that a liberal cor, 
struction in favor of the insured is most conducirt 
to trade and business and, moreover, probably mo~t 
consonant with the intention of the parties; and tha1 
in accord with the presumed intention of the parie, 
the construction should be such as not to defeat 
without the plain necessity, the insured's claim t: 
the indemnity which it was his object to secure ar.~ 
for which he paid a premium. ( 29 Am. Jur. 6+) 
Section 259, "Insurance.") 
There is nothing in the record concerning any settlr 
ment by plaintiff with United Pacific, and appellant is ill 
accurate when it argues that United Pacific "has acknow! 
edged that it is the primary carrier and that it was directl" 
liable for the loss" (Appellants' Brief), or else it would 110' 
have settled with plaintiff. (Appellants' Brief, pages 3, ]J 
15.) It is apparent that under both policies tlw insurw. 
agreements on their face both apply to cover the dama~· 
plaintiff incurred. This is why Factory Mutual clam 1' 
6 
tki(' was other insurance covering plaintiff's loss, and that 
:b polic~ afforded only "excess" coverage because plaintiff 
i1<l> injured while occupying an automobile not owned by 
1 
"named insured." In other words, Factory Mutual claims 
11 l\011ld not be liable until the limits of the United Pacific 
polin had been reached. If literal effect were to be given 
hillh. policies, the result would be that neither insurance 
,ompany could he liable to plaintiff, because United Pacific 
c,iuld also claim it had no liability until the limit of the 
fa:tory Mutual policy was reached because plaintiff was 
at the same time a "named insured under other simiwr in-
1uraHce," namely under the Factory Mutual policy. In 
other words, such a result would be absurd. 
Respondent desires to clarify how both policies referred 
to the plaintiff and respondent. We disagree (as alleged 
]J, appellant) that plaintiff "was an insured, though not 
1 named insured, under her husband's policy with Factory 
\lutual" (Appellants' Brief, page 3). We disagree because 
the defiinitions incorporated by reference under the UMC 
definitions set forth above specify that the same definition 
of "named insured" under Part I, also applies to UMC. One 
1uch de~nition so incorporated is that: 
"named insured" means the individual named in 
Item 1 of the declarations and also includes his 
spouse, ... " (Emphasis supplied.) ( R. 9.) 
The two "Other Insurance" clauses above quoted, as well 
as those at page 4 of Appellants' Brief, are identical to 
each other in every material way, but appellant quotes only 
tl1e "excess" clause that, on its face, excepts Factory Mutual 
from liability to plaintiff; it ignores the conflicting "excess" 
clause quoted on page 4 of this brief that, also on its face, 
iclieves United Pacific from any obligation to pay plaintiff 
7 
for her injuries. Here is the irreconcilable conflict I t 
)e ll'rt' 
the two policies that makes both "excess" clauses void. 
Tl,~~ Unite,~ Pacific \driver's) P,~licy included plaint'.', 
as an msured because it covered ( 2) Any other . • per11J1 , 
while occupying an insured automobile" ( R. :32 ). T\
1
, 
Factory Mutual policy covered plaintiff as " (a) the name 
insured and any relative." ( R. 9). 
It must be observed that there is no reference in tf. 
UMC insuring clause ( R. 9, Part IV, first paragraph), limi: ' 
ing the insurer's liability to an insured while occupying a; 
owned automobile or an insured automobile as those tem 
are defined. To the contrary, said UMC insuring clau~ , 
covenants to pay its insured and its named insured \ includ 
ing a spouse) ... "all sums which the insured ... sl1~: · 
be . . . entitled to recover . . . from the owner or operat0: , 
of an uninsured automobile ... arising out of the ... u•: : 
of such uninsured automobile." (Emphasis added. R. ~ : 
All cases cited by Factory Mutual that do not invoh: ! 
two conflicting "excess" clauses can be distinguished ~m:: 
discarded as inapplicable. The cases are collected in 
annotation at 69 ALR 2d 1122, entitled "Apportionm1'' 
of liability between liability insurers, each of whose polit11 
provides that it shall be 'excess' insurance." ThP leadU.' 
case preceding this annotation is Cosmopolitan Mut1wl I , 
surance Co. vs. Continental Casualty Co., 28 N. J. 55-l. Ii' 
A 2d 529, 69 ALR 2d 1115 decided in 1959, which stt· 
at 69 ALR 2d 1119: 
i 
Where problems of conflicting "other insurancr i 
provisions have arisen, many courts appear toht·.·. 
assumed that one, but not both, of such prmJ)• 
must yield in order to establish one policy as u:· 
"primary" insurance upon which the "other m,1. 
ance" provision of the "secondary" policy might 
11
i 
8 
eratc .... Based upon this premise the courts have 
developed many varied and irreconcilable tests for 
determinin~, which policy is "primary" and which 
"secondary. 
The basic argument of Factory Mutual is that it should 
not be liable because United Pacific has settled with plain-
tiff and that this proves United Pacific had "primary" lia-
hilitv. It is more logical and reasonable to assume that 
Cllited Pacific recognized the general rule that both com-
panies were liable and it desired to avoid the long and 
costly litigation that Factory Mutual has persisted in pur-
suing. No inference can ever be drawn from a compromise 
1ettlement. This is a fundamental principle that needs no 
citation of authority. 
Cosmopolitan discusses and rejects the arguments that have 
been made attempting to establish one carrier's liability as 
"primary." A 11 are rejected (citing authorities), as follows: 
( l) the "primary" policy is the one issued first in time 
(page 119, 69 ALR 2d); ( 2) the "primary" policy was 
issued to the tortfeasor (page 1120); ( 3) the "primary" 
policy has more specific coverage (page 1120); ( 4) the 
"'primary" policy is the one issued to the vehicle owner 
(page 1120). 
At page 1121 of 69 ALR 2d, Cosmopolitan squarely 
answers an argument similar to Factory Mutual and winds 
the whole matter up as follows: 
If we should accept plaintiffs contention that the 
owner's policy is primary, we would be compelled 
to completely disregard the excess clause of that 
policy .... There is no reason to give absolute effect 
to a provision in one policy while ignoring a similar 
provision in the other. Both clauses should occupy 
the same legal status. 
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~~ applie? to the facts of the present casr, boil, 
policies provide that they shall be "excess" insuran 
H . . b . J h Cc owever, it is o v10us t 1at t ere can be no ''exc · 
, e11 
insurance in the absence of "primary" insuranc:· 
Since neither policy by its terms is a policv of "p ... 
,, • • ~ 11 
!:1ary ~;i~urance, neither can op_erate as a polic)' nt 
excess msurance. The excess msurance provision, 
are mutually repugnant, and as against each other 
are impossible of accomplishment. Each prol'isini! 
becomes inoperative in the same manner that such a 
provision is inoperative if there is no other insurance 
available. Therefore, the general coverage of eacl: 
policy applies and each company is obligated t0 
share in the cost of the settlement and expense; 
We think that such a conclusion affords the onh 
rational solution of the present dispute. 
Actually, the most difficult unresolved problem prt· 
sented by cases involving two insurance policies, each of 
which has a conflicting "excess" clause, is not whether lin· 
bility exists under both; it is what method shall be used 
to apportion the loss between the two insurers. Under the 
facts of the instant case, there is no problem of prope1 
apportionment because only one insurance company i· 
before the court; and, in any event, the limits of liabilih 
of the two policies were both $5,000.00 and the judgment 
entered by the court against the uninsured motorist's ad-
ministrator is for $11,285.66, $5,000.00 of which was or· 
dered to be paid by Factory Mutual (R. 46-47). 
The following also conclude, as is contended by plaili-
tiff, that where two automobile insurance policies seek 1
11 
be "excess" over any other, that neither policy was "pn 
mary," and that each policy, regardless of its limits anrl 
10 
tht· differences, shared the liability equally to the limits 
llf the respective policies: 
Allstate vs. Atlantic National Insurance Company, 
202 F. Supp. 85. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity vs. Select Risk 
Mutual, 167 A. 2nd 821. 
State Farm Insurance Company vs. Craig, 364 SW 
2d, 343. 
There is no rational basis to find that United Pacific 
ha~ "primary" liability. 
POINT II 
THE TWO CONFLICTING "EXCESS" OTHER 
INSURANCE CLAUSES ARE MUTUALLY RE-
PUGNANT BECAUSE THEY WOULD PRO-
DUCE THE ABSURD RESULT OF NEITHER 
INSURANCE COMPANY BEING LIABLE, 
WHEREAS BOTH INSURERS WOULD BE LI-
ABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE OTHER. 
THEREFORE BOTH "EXCESS" CLAUSES ARE 
VOID AND OF NO EFFECT. 
The best view of the "forest" instead of the "trees" 
nn this question is afforded by the analysis in 7 Am. Jur. 
2d .5.54-5, Section 202, "Automobile Insurance," concerning 
Conflicts in 'Other Insurance' Clauses in Separate Policies": 
Many cases have arisen involving conflicts be-
tween insurance policies both of which purport to 
restrict or escape liability for a particular risk in the 
event that there is other insurance. Such conflicts 
have arisen, under automobile liability policies cov-
ering the same risk, in the following situations: (I) 
where one of the policies contains an "excess insur-
11 
ance" clause and the other contains a "pro rata 
clause; ( 2) where one of the policies contains . ,, . '' l dl1 e~cess msurance c ause and the other a "no liabili. 
ty clause; ( 3) where both of the policies c<mtaii 
an "excess insurance" clause; ( 4) where one of th; 
policies contains a "pro rata" clause and the other 
contains a "no liability clause; and ( 5) where a ··110 
liability" clause expressly designates the types of 
insurance with which it might conflict. 
In the third situation mentioned aboue - thb ii. 
where two or more policies provide coverage for tht 
particular event and all the policies in question con-
tain "excess insurance" clauses - it is generally held 
that such clauses are mutually repugnant and must 
be disregarded, rendering each company liable for 
a pro rata share of the judgment or settlement, since 
if literal effect were given to both "excess insurance 
clauses of the applicable policies, neither policr 
would cover the loss and such a result would produce 
an unintended absurdity. In most of these cases, 
proration has been ordered in accordance with the 
proportionate policy limits afforded by the respectire 
insurers, but this is not the universal holding. It has 
also been held that the insurer should be treated on 
an equal footing and required to bear equal sham 
of the loss. (Emphasis added. ) 
In Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. 1). U. S. F. & G. Co., 195 Fed 
2d 958, 960, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir· 
cuit, held: 
The two policies appear to us to be equally spr· 
cific and no difficultv whatever should be cncoim· 
tered in applying either to the facts if the other ~id 
not exist. It is true that the U. S. F. & G. polici 
named Suter as the insured, and it was Suter's neg· 
ligence that caused the accident. But Oregon's poli~i 
insured any person who might drive a car of tit 
12 
HP<lmond Motor Company with the latter's consent, 
and, as seen, Suter is an insured in this category. 
In our opinion the "other insurance" provisions 
of the two policies are indistinguishable in meaning 
an<l intent. One cannot rationally choose between 
them. We understand the parties to concede that 
where neither policy has an "other insurance" pro-
vision, the rule is to hold the two insurers liable to 
prorate in proportion to the amount of insurance 
provided by their respective policies. Here, where 
both policies carry like "other insurance" provisions, 
we think must be held mutually repugnant and hence 
be disregarded. Our conclusion is that such view 
affords the only rational solution of the dispute in 
this case. The proration is to be applied in respect 
both of damages and of the expense of defending 
the suits. 
The holding of the Oregon Supreme Court in Lamb-
Weston, Inc. vs. Oregon Automobile Insurance Company, 
219 Ore., 110, 341 P. 2d 110, 119, is even more impressive 
because it involved a conflicting "excess" clause and a "pro-
rata" clause and the two are still determined to be conflict-
ing, repugnant and void, resulting in liability on the part 
of both insurance companies, despite the general rule that 
the "excess" clause will be recognized. 
At page 119 of 341 P. 2d, the comt concludes: 
The "other insurance" clause of all policies are 
but methods used by insurers to limit their liability, 
whether using language that relieves them from all 
liability (usually referred to as an "escape clause") 
or that used by St. Paul (usually referred to as an 
"excess clause") or that used by Oregon (usually 
referred to as a "prorata clause"). In our opinion, 
whether one policy uses one clause or another, when 
any come in conflict with the "other insurance" 
clause of another insurer, regardless of the nature 
13 
of the clause, they are in fact repugnant and ~ 
should be rejected in toto. Sec Minnesota Lawe~ 
view, supra. (Emphasis added.) e 
The Law Review article citation is 38 Minnesota Law Re. 
view 838 ( 1954), and is an excellent treatise on this subject 
The rationale of Arditi vs. Massachusetts Bonding & 
Insurance Company, ------------ Mo. ------------, 315 S.W. 2d 736 
7 43, stating the Missouri rule, could apply also to Utah: . 
. . . The parties agree that this question ha) 
never been decided in Missouri and our conclusion 
is that we should follow the rule stated in Oregon 
Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranti 
Co., 9 Cir., 195 F. 2d 958, 960, as follows: "In olli 
opinion the 'other insurance' provisions of the two 
policies are indistinguishable in meaning and intent 
One cannot rationally choose between them. We 
understand the parties to concede that where neither 
policy has an 'other insurance' provision, the rule ~ 
to hold the two insurers liable to prorate in pro-
portion to the amount of insurance provided by theii 
respective policies. Here, where both policies cam 
like 'other insurance' provisions, we think (they) 
must be held mutually repugnant and hence be di1 
regarded." 
All authorities cited by appellant can be readily db· 
tinguished. Travelers Indemnity Company of Hartford 1•1 
Wells, 316 Fed. 2d 770 (7th Cir., 1963) does not specih 
whether two conflicting "excess" clauses were involved 
and it is submitted that either this question was not pre· 
sented to the court, or as is more likely, only one and 001 
two clauses were involved. The Virginia law also impos~ 
a statutory limit for uninsured motorist coverage, and ili< 
court felt judgment should not be entered in excess of ilir 
statutory amount. This condition does not exist in Uta! 
14 
, 
Globe Indemnity Company vs. Estate of Abraham Bar-
ker, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (incorrectly cited as 25 N. Y. S. 2d) 
correctly holds that where an insured is injured by an un-
insured motorist while a named insured, the insured's in-
surance is only excess insurance. This is a proper exclusion 
~tpplying to a person occupying an automobile not driven 
bv the owner or his relatives, and it has no application to 
tl~c case at bar because here the driver was a named in-
sured under her United Pacific policy. The situation in this 
New York case would have been duplicated in the case 
at bar if plaintiff had been riding with a driver who was 
not a named insured. 
Burcham vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, __________ Iowa 
.. _______ , 121 N. W. 2d 500 cited by appellant as applying the 
same rule as the Globe Indemnity case, actually involves a 
"pro rata" clause versus an "excess" clause, and the court 
recognizes the excess clause in accordance with the general 
rule. 
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation vs. Fire-
mans' Fund Insurance Group, 262 F. 2d 239 (inadvertently 
cited as page 259) does not involve two "excess" clauses 
hut involves a claim case where the Borrower's policy was 
'excess" and the Lender's policy was primarily liable. The 
instant case does not involve the loan of a car. 
Air Transport Manufacturing Company, Calif., 1949, 
204 P. 2d 647, also cited by appellant involves a "pro rata" 
clause and has no application here. 
Appellant also claims that plaintiff will receive a double 
recovery. Plaintiff was damaged in excess of $10,000 and 
is otherwise entitled to recovery under both policies. How 
ean this constitute a double recovery when her damages 
are greater than the sum of the face amount of both poli-
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cies? Our understanding of double recovery is limited ti, 
cases where twice the amount of the loss is recouped. Thii 
would be inequitable and improper; but such is not the 
case here. To allow Factory Mutual to escape liability to 
plaintiff under the plain intendment of its insuring clansei 
might more properly be called an unjust enrichment Uli 
the part of Factory Mutual. 
Some attempt is also made by appellant to distinguisn 
plaintiff's authorities as only involving disputes between 
two insurance companies as to whom is liable. No proper 
distinction can be drawn from this fact. The same prin· 
ciples are involved in either instance and it cannot be 
presumed that any court would apply one set of principle> 
to insurance companies that were parties litigant, and an· 
other to the controversy between an insured and her insurer. 
Appellant also contends that there is a distinction be 
tween the case at bar and the authorities relied on b) 
plaintiff that the latter primarily involve two insurance poll· 
cies written on the same automobile. That there is no ba5i> 
in such a distinction is imediately apparent. More argu· 
ments can be made for "primary" liability existing under 
plaintiff's policy than there would be under that of United 
Pacific, which is the driver's policy. The collected case> 
overwhelmingly support the doctrine that two conflictin~ 
"excess" clauses, both of which appear applicable, are mu 
tually repugnant and are of no effect. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has hen injured by an uninsured motorist in 
an amount in excess of $10,000.00, the combined uninsured 
motorist coverages of United Pacific and Factory Mutual. 
There is no rational basis to find that United Pacific had 
primary" liability and that Factory Mutual had no liability 
where both insurance companies had inconsistent "excess" 
clauses in effect with respect to the existence of other in-
qirance, making said other insurance provisions repugnant 
and of no force or effect. The trial court's decision award-
ing plaintiff summary judgment for $5,000 against Factory 
Mutual should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAYNE C. DURHAM and 
GARY L. THEURER 
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